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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Although the instant Indiana case involves a tax which has
not previously been brought to issue, the court treats it identically with other license taxes. The court bases its analysis
on the purpose of the statute, which is the preservation of wild
life, which is accomplished with the funds obtained from those
licenses. The court asserts that exempting veterans will deplete
the funds available for this purpose, and thereby defeat the purpose of the legislature in passing this license fee.
If this reasoning were to be adopted universally, it would seem
that almost all of the veteran benefits will fall. With the exception of the statutes attempting to restore pre-war status, no statute will be furthered by granting exceptions or exemptions. This
would be especially apparent with regulatory taxes, but will also
apply to other taxes with equal force. Although the Indiana court
mentioned that a large number of licenses are obtained by veterans, they do not require that the impairment of the statutory
purpose be great, but only that the exception "tend to produce
this result." This decision would seem to sound the death knell
for veterans benefits in Indiana, as perhaps in other states as well.
Raymond S. Ettlinger

CRIMINAL LAW -OBSCENE

TELEPHONE CALL

HELD COMMON LAW CRIME
Defendant was convicted of telephoning a married woman on
a four-party line, and using lewd and salacious language in soliciting her to commit sodomy and adultery with him. Held: Although the act violated no statutory provision, the common law
is still in effect in Pennsylvania and is broad enough to punish
acts which injuriously affect public morality. A dissent argued
that the judiciary had arrogated legislative functions to itself.
Commonwealth v. Mochan,__ Pa. Super. -, 110 A. 2d 788 (1955).
The decision cites cases in which killing a horse, Respublica
v. Teisher, 1 Dall. 335 (U. S. 1788), showing a lewd picture in a
private home, Commonwealth v. Sharpless,2 S. & R. 91 (Pa. 1830),
and even mildly vilifying the Christian religion, Updegraph v.
Commonwealth, 11 S. &R. 394 (Pa. 1824), were held to constitute
indictable offenses at common law.
New York abolished all common law crimes in 1881, PENAL
CODE § 2, L. 1881, c. 676, now PENAL LAw § 22, and all crimes must
now be statutory offenses. People v. Beintner, 168 N. Y. Supp.
945 (Sup. Ct. 1918); People v. Knapp, 206 N. Y. 373 (1912). But
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RECENT DECISIONS
New York has also adopted PENAL LAw §§ 43, 720, 722, which in

application cover the same ground as Pennsylvania's recognition
of common law crimes.
Under Section 43 a defendant was convicted of openly outraging public decency in asking two little girls to commit sodomy
with him. People v. Casey, 188 Misc. 352, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 9 (City
Ct. Utica 1946).
Under Section 720, the shouting of obscenities in defendant's
own backyard, but loud enough to be heard in the street, was held
to be disorderly conduct. People v. Whitman, 157 N. Y. Supp.
1107 (County Ct. 1916).
A case that clearly points up the propinquity of New York's
statutory provisions to Pennsylvania common law is People v.
Daly, 154 Misc. 149, 276 N. Y. Supp. 583 (Sp. Sess. 1935), where
defendant was convicted of disorderly conduct for threatening
bodily harm and using abusive language over the telephone.
An appraisal of the decisions under Pennsylvania common
law auspices and those dealing with the purview of the New York
"dragnet" provisions indicates that these states,, among others,
although they endorse the principle of legality and the doctrine
of nulle poena sine lege, do not wish to be precluded from dealing with grossly anti-social behavior that cannot be subsumed
under any specific positive sanction.
Howard L. Meyer, II

DOMESTIC RELATIONS-- RIGHT OF STRANGERS TO
ATI'ACK FOREIGN DIVORCE DECREE
Petition by collateral heirs to remove decedent's purported
wife as administratrix of his estate on the ground that their marriage was void, because the divorce decree obtained in Idaho by
the purported wife from her former husband was invalid for lack
of jurisdiction. Held (5-4): Collateral heirs have no standing to
attack the decree in this instance. Estate of Englund, - Wash.
-,

277 P. 2d 717 (1954).

A decree of divorce in one state is subject to collateral impeachment in another by proof of lack of jurisdiction. Williams
v. North Carolina,325 U. S. 226 (1944). No case has been found
that precludes a stranger, as such, from maintaining a collateral
attack on a divorce decree on grounds, which if proven, would
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